Analysis of general aviation single-pilot IFR incident data obtained from the NASA aviation safety reporting system by Bergeron, H. P.
NASA Technical Memorandum 80206
NASA-TM-80206 19800024876 J
Analysis of General Aviation
Single-Pilot IFR Incident
Data Obtained From the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting System
_o_ ___c_
Hugh P. Bergeron
OCTOBER 1980
LAN._LE'¢ RE_Er,,q(IH ,cErqTER
L_ _.qA Fi-i o I'-'.A "-',A
_vIp1O[_, v iR._.,l'l !A
RI/L A
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800024876 2020-03-21T15:30:12+00:00Z

NASA Technical Memorandum 80206
Analysis of General Aviation
Single-Pilot IFR Incident
Data Obtained From the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Hugh P. Bergeron
Langley Research Center
Ham#ton, Virginia
NI A
National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Scientific and Technical
Information Branch
1980
r •
Ir
L_
I •
SUMMARY
Aircraft accidents, especially in general aviation single-pilot IFR
operations, have increased rapidly in the past ]0 years. These accidents
usually result from one or more incidents involving unsafe flight operation.
Although all such incidents do not culminate in accidents, the potential
exists. Therefore, an analysis of incident data obtained from the NASA Avia-
tion Safety Reporting System has been made to determine the problem areas in
general aviation single-pilot IFR operations. The Aviation Safety Reporting
System data base is a compilation of voluntary reports of incidents from any
person who has observed or been involved in an occurrence which was believed
to have posed a threat to flight safety.
This paper examines only those reported incidents specifically related to
general aviation single-pilot IFR operations. The frequency of occurrence of
factors related to the incidents was the criterion used to define the signifi-
cant problem areas and, hence, to suggest where research is needed.
The data were cataloged into one of five major problem areas: (]) Control-
ler judgment and response problems, (2) Pilot judgment and response problems,
(3) Air traffic control (ATC) intrafacility and interfacility conflicts, (4) ATC
and pilot communication problems, and (5) IFR-VFR conflicts. The relative sig-
nificance of each of these problem areas was determined by the number of cita-
tions corresponding to each area. In addition, several points common to all or
most of the problems were observed and reported. These included human error,
communications, procedures and rules, and work load.
INTRODUCTION
General aviation accounts for approximately ]5 million of the 25 million
IFR operations occurring annually in the United States, and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) forecasts show that by ]988 these operations will almost
double to approximately 29 million. Reference ] reports that more than ]00
serious accidents per year (attributable to pilot error) have occurred in the
past few years in general aviation single-pilot IFR (SPIFR) operations. This
accident rate is expected to increase as the number of general aviation IFR
operations increases.
A significant effort is under way within NASA to investigate general avia-
tion SPIFR problems. One source of information used as an aid in identifying
these problems is the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) data base.
The ASRS data base is a compilation of voluntary incident reports from any per-
son who has observed or been involved in an occurrence which was believed to
have posed a threat to flight safety (see refs. 2 to 9). This paper examines
ASRS data for incidents related to general aviation SPIFR operations. In par-
ticular, all reports of general aviation fixed-wing aircraft flying under IFR
in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) are analyzed. The ASRS data base
does not specifically refer to SPIFR operations, but these types of operation
typically involve SPIFR. The period covered by these incident reports extends
from May 1, ]978, to January 1, ]979.
The frequency of occurrence of factors related to incidents of unsafe
flight operations are determined through the analysis of the ASRS data. The
implications of these factors are discussed, and specific problem areas are
suggested for further investigation and research.
ABBREVIATIONS
ARTC air route and traffic control
ARTCC air route and traffic control center
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATC air traffic control
ATCT air traffic control tower
DABS Discrete Address Beacon System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FSS flight service station
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMC instrument meteorological conditions
MVFR Marginal Visual Flight Rules
SPIFR single-pilot Instrument Flight Rules
SVFR special Visual Flight Rules
TCA terminal control area
VFR Visual Flight Rules
DISCUSSION OF ASRS DATA BASE
The ASRS, which is operated by NASA in support of the FAA Safety Reporting
Program, was designed for the collection, compilation, and storage of incident
reports describing occurrences that pose a threat to flight safety. Partic-
ipation is voluntary, and data represent the reporter's perception of the
occurrence.
Facets of the system which may bias the data are (1) the reports are out-
come oriented; (2) the reports may not reflect all the facts or details of the
incident; (3) the reports may reflect the opinion of the reporter; (4) the
reports are, on the whole, unverifiable; (5) the reporter is immune, in most
cases, from disciplinary action related to the reported incident; and (6) not
all incidents are reported. Even considering these limitations, simple statis-
tical information on reported occurrences can be very useful. Obviously, the
higher the frequency of the reported occurrence, the more likely it is to be a
problem in the national aviation system.
A series of quarterly reports have been published from information provided
by the ASRS data base. These reports (refs. 2 to 9) present general statistics
on incident reports for all aviation operations encompassed by the ASRS data
collected during the period extending from April 15, ]976, to March 31, ]978.
In addition to this broad analysis, several specific problem areas are identi-
fied and analyzed. Many of these problem areas have a direct impact on general
aviation SPIFR operations. The problem areas discussed in the quarterly reports
encompass the data up to that particular point in time at which the report was
published.
Repor ted Results
A major theme that is expressed, or is evident, in all the ASRS data is the
frequent involvement of human error in the incidents reported. References 2
and 3, in particular, emphasize this point. Reference 3, for example, reports
that as many as one-half of all the ASRS reports involve human error. The data
further imply that human error may be an underlying factor in most, if not all,
of the reported incidents. Incidents diagnosed as human error, however, can be
misleading. Frequently, aircraft control, ATC facility or other involved sys-
tems, were simply not originally optimized from a human factors standpoint.
Therefore, whenever human error is identified as a factor, possible system
design changes that might have prevented the incident from happening in the
first place should always be considered.
A particular flight phase that was found to be significant (refs. 1, 3,
and 4) was the terminal area operations phase. References 3 and 4, for example,
show that 50 percent of all the reports refer to incidents occurring in the ter-
minal airspace. One-third of all the incidents reported, or two-thirds of those
taking place in the terminal airspace, occurred during the approach and landing
phase. Also, night operations conducted under restricted visibility during
approach and landing posed special problems.
References 4 to 7 also refer to communications as a problem area. This
area is particularly amenable to the human factors approach mentioned previ-
ously. Misunderstood communications, especially when related to either message
confirmation or clearance interpretation, were found to be a major problem. A
recurring report theme was the use of procedural shortcuts or nonstandard
phraseology; these shortcuts were frequently associated with high density (high
work load) operations, communication problems may often lead to other problems,
such as altitude errors and flight plan deviations (see ref. 7).
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Various other problem areas, many of equal importance to the communi-
cations area, were also discussed in the quarterly reports: ATC facility
coordination problems (refs. 3, 5, 6, and 9); pilot and/or controller percep-
tion problems (refs. 3, 5, and 9); procedural problems (refs. 3, 5, and 9);
marginal VFR weather (i.e., VFR-IFR mix, ref. 8); and equipment malfunctions
(refs. 4, 5, and 9).
FORMULATION OF INCIDENT DATA
The ASRS incident data analyzed in this report are limited to the general
aviation operations typically involved in SPIFR. Since no specific category
in the ASRS data base relates to general avaition SPIFR, the following criteria
were chosen in interrogating the data base. All fixed-wing operations under
air taxi, charter operations, utility operations, corporate aviation, personal
business, pleasure flights, and training flights were selected for the analysis.
All rotary wing operations were deleted. Also, only those flights on either an
IFR or SVFR flight plan were used. These criteria produced 79 reports out of
the total 2]74 reports collected during the period from May ], ]978 (the begin-
ning of ASRS report reformatting) to January ], ]979. Based on their sources,
these 79 reports included pilot reports of flight crew errors (]4 reports),
ATC reports of flight crew errors (]5 reports), pilot reports of ATC errors
(]6 reports), and ATC reports of ATC errors (34 reports)_
The incident data reports obtained from the NASA ASRS project office con-
sisted of a synopsis and several categories of factors related to the incidents.
These categories included enabling factors, associated factors, descriptors,
recovery factors, and supplemental key words. Only two of these, enabling fac-
tors and associated factors, were considered relevant to this study and were
used in the analysis.
An enabling factor is an element that is present in the history of an
occurrence and without which the occurrence probably would not have happened.
An associated factor is an element that is present in the history of an occur-
rence and is pertinent to the occurrence under study, but which does not fulfill
the requirements of an enabling factor. Examples of both enabling and associ-
ated factors are controller perception, intrafacility co6rdination, pilot dis-
cretion, and pilot vigilance. These factors, which are_assigned as enabling or
associated by subjective assessment of experts in the particular field related
to the incident, are discussed in detail in the following section of the report.
Reference 4 presents additional details on ASRS data formatting.
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The ASRS synopsis and various categories (see the section "Formulation of
Incident Data") assigned to each reported incident were examined by the author
to determine the types of problems suggested by the data. This review of the
incident reports revealed five major problem areas that were considered to be
general aviation SPIFR specific. These problem areas are (]) Controller judg-
ment and response problems, (2) Pilot judgment and response problems, (3) ATC
intrafacility and interfacility conflicts, (4) ATC and pilot communication
problems, and (5) IFR-VFR conflicts.
The factors from two categories, enabling factors and associated fac-
tors, were also reviewed. There were 40 different enabling factors and
58 associated factors listed in the 79 incident reports; these factors are
described in table I. In the 79 reports, the 40 enabling factors were cited
a total of 99 times; the 58 associated factors were cited 82 times. (A factor
citing is a listing of that factor in the incident report.) These data imply
that more than one factor was cited in some of the incident reports.
After preliminary review, each factor citing was determined to be related
to each problem area either directly, indirectly, or not at all. A direct
relationship between a factor and a problem area implies an obvious connection
with that problem area. An indirect relationship implies a probable but not
necessarily definite connection with the problem area. There were also some
factor citings that could not be related to the problem area. These deter-
minations were made by the author based on his analysis of the data. Consider,
for example, the problem area "Controller judgment and response problems." The
enabling factor "ATCT controller perception" is related directly to this problem
area, whereas the factor"Federal Aviation Regulation" is indirectly related,
and the factor "Aircraf_parking procedure" is not related at all. This type
of classification was determined for both the enabling factors (table II) and
the associated factors (table III).
:_ Enabling Factors
Table II shows the number of enabling factor citings that are related both
directly and indirectly to each problem area. This relationship (also found in
table III for associated factors) is used as the basis for the analysis and dis-
cussion in this report.
r
Table II shows that "Controller judgment and response problems" and "Pilot
judgment and response problems" generated large numbers of directly related
enabling factor citings.. This reinforces the results noted in the review of
the quarterly reports; that is, human error (pilot and controller) is involved
in a majority of ASRS i_cidents.
An analysis of the incident data shows that "Controller judgment and
response problems" can be primarily attributed to three elements: (I) excessive/
impedingprocedural requirements, (2) training/proficiency/experience related
mistakes, and (3) equipment operational problems. Table IV lists the problem
areas and the primary problem elements within each area. Similarly, "Pilot
judgment and response problems" can be attributed primarily to three elements:
(1) excessive/impeding procedural requirements, (2) training/proficiency flight
infractions, and (3) limitations due to limited avionics. These problem ele-
ments can be used to determine the areas that need further research.
Table II also indicates that "ATC intrafacility and interfacility con-
flicts" and "ATC and pilot communication problems" were both represented by
large numbers of indirectly related enabling factor citings. This once again
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reinforces the results noted in the quarterly reports. The relatively fewer
directly related citings were attributed to the nature of the particular prob-
lem. The ASRS data do not always indicate whether or not these particular
factors could be classified as relating directly to the incidents. The data
are outcome oriented, and the insidious nature of some of the factors is not
always apparent. Communication problems, for example, may not always be appar-
ent as the cause of an incident. Close scrutiny, however, will frequently show
that communication problems frequently started a chain of events that resulted
in the reported incident.
Four "ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts" problem elements
were determined: (1) internal communication problems, (2) hand-off problems,
(3) mixed departure and arrival conflicts, and (4) equipment operational prob-
lems. Problem elements determined for the "ATC and pilot communication prob-
lems" were (I) misunderstood instructions, (2) frequency congestion, (3) exces-
sive frequency changes, and (4) excessive/impeding procedural requirements.
The last major problem area, "IFR-VFR conflicts," shows characteristics
similar to those of the previous two problem areas. A large number of factor
citings were related to this problem in an indirect relationship. The number
of such citings is disturbing, especially when considering the potentially
catastrophic results (midair collisions). The two primary problem elements
for this problem area were (1) aircraft proximity at breakout, and (2) IFR
flight in VFR and MVFR conditions.
Associated Factor s
The associated factors were considered as an independent group of citings.
Table III presents the number of associated factor citings that are related both
directly and indirectly to each problem area. The associated factors data were
used in two aspects of the analysis: (1) to determine whether additional empha-
sis should be placed on the previously discussed problems with respect to the
enabling factors (i.e., whether more emphasis should be placed on certain prob-
lem areas), and (2) to better interpret underlying implications of some of the
problem areas.
"Controller judgment and response problems" showed a large number of both
directly and indirectly related associated factor citings. The implication here
is that this particular problem is not only easy to determine for some incidents
(see enabling factors, table II) but, because of the large number of indirectly
related citings, could also be involved in many other incidents. "Controller
judgment and response problems" appear to be a contributing factor more fre-
quently than originally expected. These data suggest that a more in-depth anal-
ysis of this problem area is needed.
The results for "Pilot judgment and response problems" were as expected:
in contrast to the large number of directly related enabling factor citings
(table II), a small number of directly related and a large number of indirectly
related associated factor citings were found (table III). These data imply that
pilot judgment and response problems are usually easy to pin down.
"ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts" and "ATC and pilot communi-
cation problems" showed large numbers of citings in the indirectly related cate-
gory. These problems are also possibly involved in many of the incidents.
The results are due primarily to the outcome-oriented nature of the data col-
lection process. "ATC and pilot communication problems," for example, seldom
appear to be the principal causes of an incident (see directly related factors,
tables II and III); however, they are frequently possible contributing causes
(see indirectly related factors, tables II and III). A fair number of directly
related citings (enabling (8), and associated (]6)) were also made for "ATC
intrafacility and interfacility conflicts." Internal ATC intrafacility and
interfacility problems appear to be fairly prevalent, and should be resolved
prior to considering the pilot problems in the ATC system.
The problem area "IFR-VFR conflicts" produced a relatively significant
number of associated factor citings, both directly and indirectly related.
The implications discussed earlier (in the "Enabling Factors" section of the
report), are also relevant here; that is, the number of citings is disturbing
when considering the potentially catastrophic results of this problem area.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Table IV, which gives the five major problem areas and the corresponding
problem elements, can be used to determine theareas needing further research.
The relative significance of the problem areas can be determined from tables II
and III by the number of citings listed for each. Table IV not only defines
specific problems that need to be addressed, but also shows the interrelation-
ship of these problems. For example, human error is shown to be implicit
in most of the problems. This trend emphasizes the need for human factors
considerations in both analyzing and solving the problems.
Another element common to the data is the communication problem existing
between ATC controllers as well as between ATC controllers and pilots. This
human factors problem was present in all areas requiring exchange of informa-
tion. Current electronic technology suggests various approaches to solving this
problem. One promising concept, currently being developed by the FAA, for exam-
ple, involves a system called the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) (see
ref. ]0). DABS was designed as a data uplink/downlink capability independent
of normal voice communication channels. This concept requires further testing,
but it is a good example of the innovative technology that could be used in
solving this problem.
Procedures, both ATC and pilot, appear to be in need of some revision.
The present aviation system frequently uses procedures which were developed
many years ago and often do not meet present-day demands and/or capabilities.
An example is the common set of rules and procedures prescribed for pilots
who have a wide range of proficiency and experience and who are operating in
an equivalently wide range of aircraft classes and capabilities within the
ATC system.
Another fairly common denominator in the data is excessive pilot and con-
troller work load. This human factors problem is inherent in many of the
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present-day pilot and controller tasks, andeven though not always specifically
mentioned, it is frequently implied in many of the reported incidents. Methods,
techniques, and-systems for reducing work load are drastically needed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The data in this report were obtained from the ASRS incident data base and
were used to define problems and, hence, significant areas for research in the
general aviation SPIFR environment. Five general problem areas were identified
from the data: (]) Controller judgment and response problems, (2) Pilot judg-
ment and response problems, (3) ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts,
(4) ATC and pilot communication problems, and (5) IFR-VFR conflicts. Several
elements were determined for each of these problem areas, and the compilation
of these areas and elements can be used to define specific research programs.
The relative severity and, hence the significance of each problem area, is
defined and can be used as a reference for determining appropriate SPIFR
research efforts.
A review of the problem areas also pinpointed several points common to
all or most of the problems. These included human error, communications, pro-
cedures and rules, and work load.
It is also significant that the problems determined for SPIFR operations
followed the same general trend noted in the NASA ASRS quarterly reports which
include data from all categories of aviation operations.
Analysis of the ASRS data at continuing intervals would be beneficial in
determining the future direction of problems in the national aviation system.
Langley Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Hampton, VA 23665
August 26, ]980
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T_BLE I.- FACTORS IN THE 79 INCIDENT REPORTS ANALYZED
(a) Enabling factors
Aircraft equipment problem/navigatlon ATCT ground controller perception
Aircraft parking procedure ATCT local controller perception
Approach controller technlque/radlo Conflict alert activated
ccmn uni cation
Departure approach controller discretion
Approach controller vigilance
Departure approach controller perception
Arrival approach controller discretion
Departure controller judgment of traffic
Arrival approach controller response spacing
Arrival approach controller technique/ Federal Aviation Regulation
ccnTaunl cation
Flight crew discretion
Arrival approach controller work load
Flight crew perception
Arrlval-departure approach controller
intrafacillty coordination Flight crew technique/flying
ARTCC/ATCT interfacility coordination FSS perception
ARTCC controller interfacility coordination Ground ATCT controller distraction/task
ARTCC controller judgment of traffic spacing Instructor pilot perception
ARTCC controller perception Maintenance activity
ARTCC controller response Military ATCT controller perception/
dis cretion/techn ique
ARTCC controller technique/minlmum altitude
assignment policy Nonadherence to ATC procedure
ARTCC controller vigilance Pilot discretion
ATCT/arrlval approach controller Pilot perception/nonadherence to ATC
procedure
ATCT controller discretion
Pilot technique
ATCT controller Intrafacility coordination
Radio communication problem
ATCT controller perception
]0
TABLE I.- Concluded
(b) Associated factors
Aircraft maintenance problem FAA handbook
Aircraft under separate ATC jurisdiction Facility management policy
Airline management policy Facility manning
Airspace configuration/proximity of airspace Facility operational procedure
boundary
Familiarity with aircraft
Airspace configuration/proximity of airway/
Olive Branch Route/TCA Federal Aviation Regulation
Airspace configuration/proximity of control zone Flight crew perception
Airspace configuratlon/proximity of multiple Flight progress strip
airports and/or military airports
Frequency congestion
Airspace configuration/proximity of TCA
boundary Frequency guarded
Altitude heading rules Intrafacility coordination
Approach/ARTC controller interfacility Personnel availability
coordination
Pilot discretion
Arrival approach controller interfacility
coordination Pilot experience level
Arrival approach controller work load Pilot perception
ARTCC controller perception Pilot response
ARTCC controller vigilance Pilot technique, radio communication
procedure while in the air
ARTCC interfacillty coordination
Proximity of thunderstorm
ARTCC intrafacility coordination
• Radar coverage limitation .•
ATC procedure
Radar equipment problem
ATCT controller judgment of traffic spacing
Radar signal clarity
ATCT controller technique/ATC
Radio communication problem
ATCT ground controller perception
See-and-avoid concept
ATCT intrafacility coordination
Similar sounding aircraft n_ber
ATCT local controller work load • ••
Taxi procedure
Clearance interpretation
TRACON interfacility coordination
Clearance readback
TRACON intrafacility coordination
Ccnmunicati on problem _
Traffic vol _e/conges tion
Departure controller perception
Visibility reduced/rain
Distraction/audio
Visibility reduced/haze
Distr action/tas k
]]
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_IBLE II.- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM AREAS AND ENABLING FACTOR GROUP
Factors cited
Problem area
Directly related Indirectly related
Controller judgment and response problems 56 8
Pilot judgment and response problems 30 0
ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts 8 56
ATC and pilot communication problems 5 86
IFR-VFR conflicts 0 38
TABLE III .- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEM AREAS AND ASSOCIATED FACTOR GROUP
Factors cited
Problem area
Directly related Indirectly related
Controller judgment and response problems 34 _ 32
Pilot judgment and response problems 8 ]6
ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts ]6 49
ATC and pilot communication problems 9 42
IFR-VFR conflicts ]5 24
_%BLE IV.- PROBLEM AREAS AND PRIMARY ELEMENTS
Controller judgment and response problems :_
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
-Training/proficiency/experience related mistakes
-Equipment operational problems
Pilot judgment and response problems
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
-Training/proficiency flight infractions
-Limitations due to limited avionics
ATC intrafacility and interfacility conflicts
-Internal communication problems
-Hand-off problems
-Mixed departure and arrival conflicts
-Equipment operational problems
ATC and pilot communication problems
-Misunderstanding of instructions
-Frequency congestion
-Excessive frequency changes
-Excessive/impeding procedural requirements
IFR-VFR conflicts
-Aircraft proximity at breakout
"IFR flight in VFR and MVFR conditions
r
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